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THE "RECOGNIZED STATURE" STANDARD IN THE
VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT
Christopher J. Robinson*
[The Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA")] recognizes that visual
art plays an important role in our cultural life, and that artists who
have put their hearts and souls into their creations deserve
protection for their efforts.
Representative Kastenineier, June 5, 19901
[O]ne person's art is another person's garbage.
David Cazares, Sun-Sentinel, September 29, 19957
INTRODUCTION
In the dying hours of the 101st Congress, the United States Senate
enacted the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, authorizing eighty-
five federal judgeships. Tacked on to the Act under a separate title
was the Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA") which, for the first time
in federal law, recognized an artist's moral rights in his works of art
The Act was a compromise between many conflicting interests, and
the result was immediately criticized from several quarters.' The
passage of VARA, however, marked a significant departure from
prior property law.6 VARA grants artists two new rights, the right of
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. I should like to
thank professors Hugh Hansen and Benjamin Zipursky and attorneys Daniel Weiner
and Ronald Ponzoli for their helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank my
parents, my wife, and my children for their support. This is for my father.
1. 136 Cong. Rec. 12,608 (1990).
2. David Cazares, Art Attack?: Hollywood Center Calls Artist's Materials 'Jtmk,'
Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale), Sept. 29, 1995, at IB; see infra notes 206-19 and
accompanying text.
3. See Pub. L. No. 101-650,104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
4. Visual Artists Rights Act ("VARA"), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, 104 Stat.
5128 (1990) (codified in part in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501,
506 (1994)); see infra note 6.
5. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
6. The last-minute enactment of such a revolutionary measure as VARA,
without serious debate and riding on the coattails of a key bill, was criticized by
George C. Smith, chief minority counsel for the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Technology and the Law. "Without so much as a word of debate or discussion, the
Artists Act (sic) became law. The lack of debate is unfortunate because the new
statute constitutes one of the most extraordinary realignments of private property
1935
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attribution and the right of integrity.7  The right of attribution
concerns the artist's right to claim authorship of a work created by
him and to deny authorship of a work not his own.8 The right of
integrity concerns the artist's right to prevent or to recover damages
for the intentional distortion, mutilation, modification, or destruction
of his work.9 The revolutionary aspect of VARA is that the artist
retains these rights throughout his lifetime, even when the original
work to be protected is no longer in his possession.
Unlike the European recognition of moral rights, which is centered
on the artist's right to protect and exploit his creative output for his
own honor or reputation," the policy bases of VARA are more
complex. On the one hand, moral rights are personal to the artist.
Fine art is unique among the arts in one important sense. A
disproportionate percentage of the value of a work of fine art is in the
physical object created, rather than the exploitation of derivatives or
copies."a Damage to the original object is prejudicial to an artist's
ability to exploit the object for his enhanced honor and reputation, in
a way that is not true for an author of a literary work or musical
composition. VARA was an attempt to compensate visual artists for
this imbalance in copyright law. 2
On the other hand, VARA recognizes a public interest in the
encouragement of artists to work and in the preservation of their work
once created.13 Appealing to the public interest on a narrow front
helped ensure the passage of the legislation by invoking a higher
social good than that of the individual gain of the artist or property
holder. 4 Public interest thus justified the intervention of federal law
into what many considered a private contractual matter. By
underpinning a copyright act with the public duty to preserve the
nation's art and cultural patrimony, the Act also responded to a
world-wide concern over issues of cultural protection and integrity. 5
This Note concentrates on one particularly contentious provision of
VARA-the "recognized stature" provision contained in 17 U.S.C. §
rights ever adopted by Congress." John Henry Merryman & Albert E. Elsen, Law,
Ethics and the Visual Arts 283-84 (3d ed. 1998).
7. See infra notes 24, 100-01 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 24, 100-01 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 24, 100-01 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 258-61.
12. See infra notes 258-61.
13. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
14. For Representative Fish's comments in support of VARA, see 136 Cong. Rec.
12,610 (1990) ("This legislation should not be viewed as a precedent for the extension
of so-called moral rights into other areas. This legislation addresses a very special
situation in a very careful and deliberate way.").
15. See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77
Cal. L. Rev. 339 passim (1989) (pointing to the validity of a public interest in cultural
property and the conflicting goals of preservation, truth, and access).
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106A(a)(B). The section states that an artist of a work of visual art 6
has the right "to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that
work is a violation of that right.' 7 The existence of the recognized
stature provision in VARA was both generous and restraining:
generous in that it granted a moral right beyond that commonly
accepted in Europe; restraining in that it qualified the right in a way
antithetical to traditional United States copyright law and likely to
lead to judicial confusion.
Part I lays out the theory and practice of moral rights in Europe and
the United States leading up to the enactment of VARA in 1990. It
first discusses the definition and scope of moral rights as they are
conceived in Europe and in the United States, the use of a
"recognized quality" standard for the protection of art in some states,
the inclusion of a recognized stature standard in moral rights bills in
Congress in the late 1980s, and the ultimate enactment of VARA in
1990. Part II discusses the application of the recognized quality or
recognized stature standard in the few cases published and describes a
brief selection of disputes invoking the recognized stature provision of
VARA in the destruction of large-scale sculpture and murals. Part III
analyzes the issues raised by the recognized stature provision both
from a theoretical standpoint and in light of the cases and disputes
outlined in Part II. The issues are discussed as they impact VARA
first as a copyright measure and second as a preservative measure.
The recognized stature provision neither protects fully the rights of
artists in the integrity of their works, nor furthers the aims of United
States copyright law as expounded in the copyright clause.
Furthermore, the inclusion of a recognized stature standard results in
a weakening of the preservation aims of the statute. This part
concludes with a discussion of some of the practical evidentiary
problems of the recognized stature standard that have been revealed
by the litigation. Part IV offers a tentative proposal to approach the
personal copyright and public preservation goals of VARA more
effectively. This part argues that the recognized stature standard
should be abandoned and that VARA should offer the same
protection against the destruction of works of art as it does to their
alteration or mutilation. More controversially, this part concludes
that the preservation goals of VARA might be better served by
separate legislation establishing a national registry of significant works
of art. Works, regardless of date, would be chosen for the registry by
a panel of experts. Registered works would be protected by a
complete ban on modification or destruction within the United States,
supported by criminal penalties. To encourage registration and to
16. For a definition of "visual art," see infra note 100.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (1994).
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preserve the market value of a work, registered works might be freely
exported or sold. The two-pronged legislation proposed in this Note
would not protect all works of art from mutilation or destruction, and
would face constitutional and practical challenges, but the proposal
has the merit of promoting the copyright interests of artists in an
equitable manner as well as preserving the most significant art in the
United States for future generations.
I. MORAL RIGHTS AND THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS
ACT
This part outlines the policy justifications and the scope of artists'
moral rights in Europe and the United States. It discusses the state
statutes of the 1980s recognizing moral rights in visual artists, and
concludes with the legislative history and ultimate enactment of
VARA.
A. Moral Rights in Europe and the United States: Theory and
Practice
Moral rights appear to have originated in France in the 19th
century, premised on the work of the German philosophers Kant and
Hegel. 8 Commentators have pointed to several catalysts to the
creation of moral rights, from the fall of the Ancien Rrgime, 19 the rise
of the artist as entrepreneur, free of aristocratic or church patronage,
to the Romantic emphasis on the original creation of the lonely
genius. 2° But it is no coincidence that such rights arose in a culture
that was both proud of its modern accomplishments, yet acutely aware
of its dependence on the art of the past. French artists and writers
were as much concerned with how future generations of Frenchmen
would judge them, as they were with their contemporaneous
18. See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 Colum.-VLA
J.L. & Arts 361,370-72 (1998).
19. See generally Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A
Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United States, 28 Bull. Copyright Soc'y
1, 7-11 (1980) (discussing nineteenth century judicial development of moral rights in
France based on Revolutionary laws and the growing philosophy of individualism);
Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 991, 996 (1990) (arguing that French
Revolutionary and early American copyright law were both designed to encourage
the creation of works of art promoting national social goals); Calvin D. Peeler, Front
the Providence of Kings to Copyrighted Things (and French Moral Rights), 9 Ind. Int'l
& Comp. L. Rev. 423, 428-33, 449-52 (1999) (tracing the evolution of moral rights in
France from Revolutionary legislation through nineteenth century judicial
interpretation); Swack, supra note 18, at 370 ("In France, the state of the law
addressing artists' rights did not change until the fall of the ancien regime.").
20. See Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 675,
682-84 (1982); Peeler, supra note 19, at 449-52.
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reputation.'
Moral rights vary in scope, but they all recognize certain rights in an
artist's work that are distinct from traditional property rights and that
rely less on economic rationales than on the right to the continued
control of the artist's creative personality through control over the art
itself.' Moral rights acknowledge that an artist has, in addition to an
economic interest in his reputation, a creative persona that is injected
into the work of art at creation and which remains a part of the work
despite his physical relinquishment of the object to others."- The
subsequent disposition of the work, especially if it lies in public view,
has a lasting effect on the artist's reputation, with impact on his
dignity and career.
At their most expansive, moral rights invest in the artist the right to:
(1) have his name associated with all his creations and no others
(paternity or attribution); (2) prevent mutilation, distortion or
alteration of the art (integrity); (3) choose when and if his work vill
be revealed to the public (disclosure); and (4) withdraw and alter his
work once revealed (retraction or withdrawal). 4 The scope of moral
rights protection in Europe varies widely?- The Berne Convention
adopts a minimalist approach, requiring only that member countries
enact provisions protecting rights to paternity and integrity, leaving
some countries, such as France, to add protections of their own. 6
21. An acute awareness of the great traditions of their art form, coupled with a
realization that many of those traditions were artistically played out, led many
nineteenth century artists and writers to debate their status in that creative pantheon.
Moral rights ensured that their work obtained every present advantage for the future
assessment of that status.
22. Moral rights, not surprisingly, are a favorite of academics, and articles on the
subject far outnumber the cases in which moral rights are invoked. Particularly
authoritative are those by Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit
Moral, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1997); Edward J. Damich (eg., The Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 945 (1990)); Jane C. Ginsburg (e.g.. Copyright in the 101st Congress:
Commentary on the Visual Artists Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act of 1990, 14 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 477 (1990)); John Henry
Merryman (eg., The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 Hastings L.J. 1023 (1976)).
23. The creative persona rationale leads to a droit de suite or resale right in which
the artist shares in the profits of resale of his work. See Michael B. Reddy, The Droit
de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15
Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 509, 515-17 (1995). The resale right has a limited acceptance in
Europe and in California in the California Art Preservation Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 987
(West 1982 & Supp. 2000). See infra note 45.
24. See Swack, supra note 18, at 365-66.
25. See generally Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author. Moral Rights and
the Civil Law Countries, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 199 (1995) (discussing the scope
of moral rights in Europe); Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author Moral
Rights and the Common Law Countries, 19 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 229 (1995)
(discussing the scope of moral rights primarily in England and the United States).
26. Article 6bis of the Convention states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Significantly, there is no express provision in the Berne Convention
against the complete destruction of a work of art, on the principle that
no harm to an artist's reputation and honor can come from a work
that no longer exists.27
In the United States, hostility to the concept of moral rights was
founded on the dual factors of a more limited interpretation of
copyright protection, derived from the Constitution, and a profound
respect for traditional economic rights in property.8 The United
States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."29 Rather than protecting some natural
right, the statutory copyright protection derived from the copyright
clause has as its principal aim the interests of society as a whole. 0
Natural rights are limited to those that encourage the creation and
dissemination of Science and the Useful Arts.3 Authors other than
visual artists are generally able to exploit their paternity and integrity
rights because they either retain their original works and license with
care, or they sell their rights. Licensing or sale encourage the creation
and dissemination envisaged by the Framers.32 In answer to the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or
other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
Article 6bis, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. The Berne
Convention, the most important international treaty on copyright, was opened for
signature on September 9, 1886. Although the United States participated in the
convention as an observer, it did not join the treaty at that time due to the
philosophical differences between United States and European copyright. See
generally Sam Ricketson, The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works: 1886-1986, passim (1987). For calls to broaden or revise the moral
rights provisions of Berne, see, for example, Dietz, supra note 25, at 225-27; Dworkin,
supra note 25, at 263-66.
27. The omission of protection against the complete destruction of a work of art is
controversial in Europe. The Berne Convention stopped short of including
destruction in article 6bis, but passed a Resolution suggesting that member countries
should on their own initiative prevent destruction in their moral rights legislation. See
Dworkin, supra note 25, at 251 n.81.
28. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of
Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 569 (1940); see also Yardley v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 25 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) ("When a man,
hereinafter referred to as a patron, contracts with an artist to paint a picture for him.
of whatever nature it may be, the contract is essentially a service contract, and when
the picture has been painted and delivered to the patron and paid for by him, the
artist has no right whatever left in it.").
29. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30. See Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American
Artists Burned Again, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 373, 389-90 (1995).
31. See id.
32. Furtherance of the creation and dissemination goals of the Framers is the
rationale behind statutory exceptions to exclusive rights of authors in the Copyright
Act. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994) (addressing compulsory licenses for non-
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limited protections afforded by copyright law, causes of action in
defamation, breach of contract, and unfair competition provided some
protection analogous to moral rights.33
The inadequacy of protections afforded the artist was a subject of
debate long before the United States entry to Berne in 1988.1
Attempts to enforce a moral right equivalent under common law
actions such as defamation, although promising in principle, were
rarely successful, in particular when the courts saw traditional
property rights compromised. 35  Congress made numerous
unsuccessful attempts to pass moral rights legislation.- Prompted by
press attention to particularly egregious maltreatment of well-known
works of art, state legislatures, led by California, began to enact their
own moral rights protection.37
State moral rights provisions fall into two categories, each reflecting
a choice of emphasis between two separate protection rationales?.
The first rationale is primarily preservative, having as its goal the
preservation of artistic works for their value to society.39 Supporters
of this view note the beneficial effects art has on the spiritual and
mental health of those who live among it, and seek to protect art in its
infancy when it is most vulnerable to the perils of development,
neglect, and greed.'
The second rationale, and the dominant one, looks primarily to the
artist, to his incentives to create and his interest both economic and
dramatic musical works); id. § 107 (addressing fair use).
33. For an analysis of the common law alternatives to moral rights legislation, see
Roeder, supra note 28, at 575-78.
34. See iL
35. See, e.g., Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church in New York, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813,
819 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (denying a cause of action to an artist for damage to a mural in a
church once artist received payment for the original commission). But cf., Gilliam v.
American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting the creators of a
television comedy program the equivalent of a moral right). Other cases are
summarized in Ralph E. Lerner & Judith Bresler, Art Law 950-59 (2d ed. 1998).
36. Bills of some kind were presented in almost every year from 1979 onward. See
H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,6918 n.13.
37. The catalyst to the California legislation was the dispute over Simon Rodia's
"Watts Towers" sculpture. See Joseph L. Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt:
Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures 23-24 (1999). The impetus to the New
York legislation was the destruction of Joseph Serra's sculpture -Tilted Arc." See
Public Art Public Controversy: The Tilted Arc on Trial passimn (Sherrill Jordan et al.
eds., 1987) (presenting documentation and commentary on the Serra controversy).
See generally Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 667 F. Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (dismissing complaint by artist against USGSA when the agency decided to
relocate site-specific sculpture in a plaza adjoining a government office building),
affd, 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
38. See Thomas J. Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights: The Immoral Triumph of
Emotionalism, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 317, 325-26 (1989); Merryman & Elsen, supra note
6, at 257.
39. See Merryman & Elsen, supra note 6, at 257.
40. See Sax, supra note 37, at 24.
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personal in his reputation and honor.41 By preserving art in the form
the artist intended, and by ensuring that he is acknowledged the
author of that art and no other, moral rights legislation encourages the
creation and dissemination of art.42  The injury to the artist's
reputation occurs in the public's perception of a mutilated or modified
work. Under this view, art deserves no protection unless launched
into the public sphere.43 The beneficial effect of the art on members
of society is a fortuitous bi-product of an essentially private matter.
State legislatures, beginning with California, saw the merits of both
principles.' The preamble to the California Art Preservation Act
("CAPA") states:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the physical
alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the
artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation, and
artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of fine art
against such alteration or destruction; and that there is also a public
interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.45
CAPA, following the lead of Berne, affords protection to the rights
of paternity and integrity by granting artists a cause of action against
anyone who intentionally alters, defaces, destroys, or mutilates a work
of fine art executed by them.46 The Act departs from Berne in several
ways, most notably for present purposes in protecting works from
complete destruction and limiting any protection to works of fine art,
a minimum quality standard laid out in the table of definitions. Fine
art is defined as art of "recognized quality" in certain media.48 The
Act also states that: "In determining whether a work of fine art is of
recognized quality, the trier of fact shall rely on the opinions of artists,
art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, and other
persons involved with the creation or marketing of fine art., 49 The
recognized quality standard and the cited list of professionals are
consistent with the Act's emphasis on preservation of the artistic
heritage, the first of the two moral rights rationales." The Act's
41. See Davis, supra note 38, at 326; Merryman & Elsen, supra note 6, at 257.
42. See Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[T]he
copyright law should be used to recognize the important role of the artist in our
society and the need to encourage production and dissemination of artistic works by
providing adequate legal protection for one who submits his work to the public.").
43. The protection in several state moral rights statutes is linked to works publicly
displayed. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
44. See Davis, supra note 38, at 325-29.
45. Cal. Civ. Code § 987(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 2000).
46. See id. § 987(c)(1). The protection is extended to the artist's heir, legatee, or
personal representative for an additional 50 years after the artist's death. See id. §
987(g)(1).
47. See id. § 987(b)(2).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 987(0.
50. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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language also reflects a legislative fear of nuisance or trivial suits.5'
The Act as written, however, leaves the height of the recognized
standard bar to the courts.
Following California's lead, other states enacted moral rights
legislation.52 Massachusetts (1984), - Pennsylvania (1986),' Louisiana
(1986).1 and New Mexico (1987)56 granted rights based on the
California model. Although each has its peculiarities, they all impose
a "recognized quality" standard for protected work and recognize a
societal benefit to the preservation of the artistic heritageY They also
state that the court should rely on the same professionals listed in the
California statute."
A number of states, New York (1983),19 Maine (19 85 ),' New Jersey
(1986),61 Rhode Island (1987),6 Connecticut (1988)1 and Nevada
(1989),64 rejected any overt acknowledgement of the broader goal of
protecting the cultural heritage of art and based their moral rights
statutes on the Berne concern for the personal reputation and honor
of the artist.65 These states, beginning with New York, premised the
rights of paternity and integrity on the present display of the work of
art at issue.' They included no provision for the protection against
destruction and required no finding of recognized quality.b
In 1982, three years after the enactment of CAPA, the California
legislature reacted to popular and academic criticism of the limits of
the Act and passed the Cultural and Artistic Creations Preservation
Act ("CACPA").68 This Act supplements CAPA by acknowledging a
public interest in preserving cultural and artistic works independent of
51. See Merryman & Elsen, supra note 6, at 264.
52. For analyses of state moral rights statutes, see generally Davis, supra note 38;
Lerner & Bresler, supra note 35, at 959-65; Brian T. McCartney, "Creepings" and
"Glimmers" of the Moral Rights of Artists in American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA Ent.
L. Rev. 35, 55-70 (1998).
53. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 85S (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1999).
54. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (West 1993).
55. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 88 51:2151-:2156 (West 1987 & Supp. 2000).
56. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (Michie 1997).
57. See Davis, supra note 38, at 325-26.
58. See id at 327 n.63, 329 n.94, 333 n.140, 337 n.173.
59. See N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
60. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988).
61. See NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 1997).
62 See R-I. Gen. Laws § 5-62-2 to -6 (Michie 1999).
63. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-116s-t (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
64. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.720-.760 (Michie 1999).
65. Utah, Georgia, Montana, and South Dakota have some abbreviated form of
protection. See Lemer & Bresler, supra note 35, at 965; McCartney, supra note 52, at
70.
66. See Davis, supra note 38, at 325-26.
67. See id. at 326 n.57.
68. See Cal. Civ. Code § 989 (West Supp. 2000). Massachusetts followed suit with
a similar provision. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 85S (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp.
1999).
1943
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the interest of the artist.69 This public interest extends to the work of
artists deceased or unknown, whose work remains unprotected by
CAPA.0 The Act gives a cause of action to any established arts
organization acting in the public interest to seek an injunction
preventing damage to or restoring a work of fine art.7" A work of fine
art is defined as a work of "recognized quality, and of substantial
public interest."72  California and Massachusetts remain alone in
enacting legislation granting a public cause of action for what are
effectively community moral rights.73
B. The Visual Artists Rights Act
When the United States adhered to the Berne Convention in 1988,
the Committee on the Judiciary concluded that current United States
law met the requirements of Article 6bis by providing to authors
protection equivalent to Article 6bis moral rights.74 Nonetheless,
dissatisfaction over the moral rights protection of fine artists, as well
as the edifying examples of the states, encouraged the pursuit of
federal protection for paternity and integrity rights.75
1. Genesis of Federal Moral Rights Protection
While Congress was debating proposals for Berne adherence
legislation, moral rights bills were already in discussion in the Senate
and the House.76 In 1987, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced The
Visual Artists Rights Act,77 and hearings were held in December
1987.78 The bill contained many of the provisions that characterize the
Act of 1990. Important differences between the two exist, however,
which help explain the presence of the recognized stature provision in
the 1990 Act. As introduced, the 1987 bill contained both a moral
69. See Cal. Civ. Code § 989(a).
70. See id. § 989(b)(1).
71. See id. § 989(c).
72. Id. § 989(b)(1).
73. The New York legislature considered, but did not adopt, a bill allowing the
state attorney general to sue to protect works of art by deceased artists in public view.
See Janine V. McNally, Comment, Congressional Limits on Technological Alterations
to Film: The Public Interest and the Artists' Moral Right, 5 High Tech. L.J. 129, 148
n.136 (1990).
74. See S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 38 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706,
3736. The United States had considerable support in Europe for this belief. See
Dworkin, supra note 25, at 240-42.
75. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917-
19.
76. See id. at 6915-16, 6918 n.12.
77. See S. 1619, 100th Cong., 133 Cong. Rec. 22,950-52 (1987).
78. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 1619 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. (1987) [hereinafter S. 1619 Hearing]. Senator Kennedy had introduced a
similar bill, S. 2796, to the 99th Congress in 1986. See 133 Cong. Rec. 22,950 (1987).
1944 [Vol. 68
2000] RECOGNIZED STATURE STANDARD IN VARA 1945
rights and a resale rights (droit de suite) component, modeled closely
on CAPA.7 9 The moral rights provisions gave authors of publicly
displayed "works of fine art" the right to claim or disclaim authorship
of such work.'0 The "significant or substantial distortion, mutilation,
or other alteration" of any publicly displayed work was a violation of
the author's rights and enforceable by the author, or by his estate for
fifty years after his death."' Subject to provisions concerning works
fixed within buildings, the bill afforded protection against destruction
of any work of fine art.' A work of fine art was defined as "a
pictorial, graphic or sculptural work of recognized stature.""- The bill
offered guidance for the finding of recognized stature:
In determining whether a work is of recognized stature, a court or
other trier of fact may take into account the opinions of artists, art
dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art museums, restorers and
conservators of fine art, and other persons involved with the
creation, appreciation, history, or marketing of fine art.8
The bill, therefore, resembled CAPA in that it suggested that the
court look to expert opinion in deciding recognized stature.
Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, analyzed the 1987 bill for the
Committee.8 He acknowledged that the recognized stature standard
entailed a departure from traditional United States copyright law:
Traditionally, the [U.S.] copyright law has not given additional rights
to a work based on its quality.... The proposed distinction based on
aesthetics has preservation and national cultural interests as the
raison d'Otre; it may be in the national interest to treat works of
greater aesthetic merit with greater respect. In copyright law,
however, the marketplace has traditionally controlled the benefits
accorded works of differing quality. Congress has so far been
unwilling to let judges act as arbiters of aesthetic quality.'
79. As a Senator from Massachusetts, Kennedy had experience with the
California moral rights legislation model in his own state's statute. See supra notes 52-
58 and accompanying text. On resale rights, see supra note 23.
80. See S. 1619, 100th Cong. § 106(b)(1)-(2), 133 Cong. Rec. 22,951 (1987).
81. Id. § 106(c)(1).
82. See id. § 106(c)(2).
83. Id. § 101.
84. Id. Note that this provision differs from the California equivalent in several
ways, including the substitution of "may" for "shall," the substitution of "recognized
stature" for "recognized quality," and the expansion of the list of experts. The shift in
the wording of the standard to "stature," without precedent in the state legislation,
has not been explained, although it may have been an attempt to emphasize that the
personal aesthetic judgement of the court was not to be a factor in the court's
analysis. At least one practitioner who has experience in litigation under CAPA and
VARA considers the "stature" standard a higher bar to liability than "quality." See
Peter H. Karlen, What's Wrong With VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights, 15
Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 905,916-17 (1993).
85. See S. 1619 Hearing, supra note 78, at 21 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register
of Copyrights).
86. Id. at 24-25 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
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In answer to a written question from Senator Hatch on this stature
bar, Oman stated that the Copyright Office approved of the departure
from prior copyright practice because "strong moral rights provisions
attaching to all pictorial and sculptural works regardless of quality
could be overly stringent."'  The right against destruction, absent
from Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, was an "extraordinary
right.., awarded exclusively to works of fine art in recognition of the
national interest in preserving both the unique intellectual property
and its embodiment."' The 1987 bill failed, in large part due to the
inclusion of the resale right provision.
2. The Enactment of VARA
When the Visual Artists Rights Act was reintroduced in June 1989
as H.R. 2690, there were important differences from the 1987 bill in
the recognized stature provisions."9 In place of the CAPA-inspired
definition of a work of fine art as a work of recognized stature, the
new definition of a work of "visual art" contained no minimum stature
standard.' All visual art under the new definition was protected from
"destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification" of a work
that would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation."
Furthermore, such destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of a work of recognized stature would "constitute
prejudice to the honor and reputation of the author of that work."
The bill created a virtual per se standard for the protection of works
of recognized stature.93
Four days before the introduction of H.R. 2690 in the House,
Senator Kennedy had introduced his new proposed Visual Artists
Rights Act ("VARA"). 94 Although similar to the House bill, Senator
Kennedy's proposal retained the distinction in his previous bills
between the distortion, mutilation, and modification rights that were
prejudicial to an artist's honor and reputation, and the destruction of a
87. Id. at 61 (responses to Supplemental Written Questions from Senator Hatch).
88. Id. at 26 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
89. See 135 Cong. Rec. 12,596-98 (1989).
90. See H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. § 101, 135 Cong. Rec. 12,597 (1989) (defining
"work of visual art").
91. Id. § 106A(a)(3).
92. Id.
93. The per se standard was criticized by Ralph Oman in the House Hearing. See
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Intell.
Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. 2690, 101st
Cong. 66 (1989) [hereinafter H.R. 2690 Hearing] ("[T]he Office recommends
reconsideration of this provision. Perhaps a per se standard could be justified in the
interest of preservation, and only the destruction of the work should constitute a per
se violation. Alternatively, distortion or mutilation, as well as destruction, might
constitute per se violations of the right in works of recognized stature.").
94. See 135 Cong. Rec. 12,250-52 (1989).
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work of recognized stature.95 Similarly, courts were urged to consult a
very similar list of experts in their recognized stature determination to
that proposed in the 1987 bill.96 Following hearings on the House bill,
the Committee on the Judiciary adopted essentially the Senate bill of
Senator Kennedy, deleting from H.R. 2690 the recognized stature
standard for harm short of destruction.' In support of its decision, the
Committee cited fears of increased litigation due to a battle of expert
witnesses over the standard, and a desire to make clear that "an
author need not prove a pre-existing standing in the artistic
community" to be protected.98 The recognized stature standard was
retained, however, for the complete destruction of a work." Although
the House Report affirms the provision's preservation rationale, it
makes no comment on the retention of a recognized stature standard
for preservation, nor on the decision to omit from the Act the
recommended list of experts.10°
VARA thus establishes rights of attribution and integrity for
authors of works of visual art as defined in the amendment to section
101.101 The right of integrity, subject to important limitations on
works fixed in buildings as set forth in section 113(d), is:
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of that work is a violation of that right, and to prevent
any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional
or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that
right.102
The cause of action is limited to the author of the work." 3 The
95. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
96. See S. 1198, 101st Cong. § 106A(a)(3)(B), 135 Cong. Rcc. 12,251 (1989).
97. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 14-16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6924-26.
98. Id. at 6925.
99. See id. at 6926. The retention of a recognized stature standard for the
destruction of an artwork was suggested by the Copyright Office. See H.R. 2690
Hearing, supra note 93, at 66, 73.
100. See id.
101. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (1994). A "work of visual art" is defined as:(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast,
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of
the author, or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author.
Id § 101.
102- Id § 106A(a)(3)(A).
103. See id. § 106A(b). Only at the last minute was the term of protection under
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rights are unassignable, untransferable, and uninheritable, but they
are waivable.1' Works that are incorporated into buildings with the
artist's consent and that may not be removed without mutilating or
destroying the work are not protected by VARA. °5 When the work
can be removed without causing the enumerated harm, however,
moral rights do apply, unless the building owner makes an
unsuccessful good-faith attempt to contact the artist who fails to
remove the work or pay for its removal."
The conflicting ideologies and rationales from which VARA
emerged resulted in a narrow but profound amendment to the
Copyright Act. While VARA incorporated a personality and
preservation rationale, it left many questions of application of these
twin goals unanswered, not least the impact of the recognized stature
standard. Part II examines the application of the recognized stature
provision in subsequent litigation.
II. LITIGATION UNDER VARA AND STATE MORAL RIGHT
STATUTES
Judicial application of VARA and the related state statutes is
limited to a mere handful of cases, and in even fewer is the recognized
stature or recognized quality provision at issue. The standard is cited
often enough in the case law and in recorded disputes, however, to
allow an analysis of the standard's theoretical and practical
application. This part discusses those cases and disputes in which
recognized stature or recognized quality are at issue. The litigation
reveals confusion over the purpose of the recognized stature
provision-for example, whether the standard is intended merely to
filter out nuisance suits or should act as a substantial hurdle for the
plaintiff-and what type of proof is required to satisfy the standard.
A. Case Law Involving Recognized Stature
The earliest and most influential case addressing the recognized
stature provision of VARA is Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.107 Three
sculptors sought an injunction to prevent the owners of a commercial
building in Queens, New York, from altering or destroying a sculpture
VARA reduced from the author's life plus 50 years to the author's life alone. See
Sherman, supra note 30, at 407 n.198.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)-(e).
105. See id. § 113(d).
106. See id.
107. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd in part, vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208 (1996). See generally Rebecca J. Morton, Note,
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.: A Fair Test of the Visual Artists Rights Act?, 28 Conn.
L. Rev. 877 (1996) (analyzing Carter and arguing for amendments to VARA to
improve VARA's preservation effects).
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made by the artists for the lobby of the building."° The court found
that the elements of the sculpture and mosaic floor of the lobby
constituted a single work of art for the purposes of VARA, and that
the functional character of parts of the work did not define it as
applied art and thus beyond the protection of VARA.'t The court
went on to find that the installation satisfied the definition of a work
of art under VARA and that it was not a work for hire."'
The court next considered the claim that "intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification" of the work would be "prejudicial to
[plaintiff's] honor or reputation." '' Both parties presented expert
witnesses."2 Testifying for the plaintiffs were Professor Robert
Rosenblum, an art critic and professor of art history at New York
University, Jack S. Shainman, president and director of a
contemporary art gallery, and Professor Aedwyn Darroll, a professor
at the Parsons School of Design and at the Fashion Institute of
Technology in New York."' Appearing for the defendant was the
editor and art critic of The New Criterion, Hilton Kramer.' Judge
Edelstein was candid in his assessment of the credibility of the expert
witnesses on this issue, crediting the testimony of the plaintiffs'
experts, but criticizing Mr. Kramer, whose appalled reaction to most
contemporary art, familiar to readers of his journal, evidently colored
his testimony.' The judge noted that "in [Kramer's] opinion, the
artists have no reputation," and that "no artist has a reputation in the
art world unless Mr. Kramer is familiar with writings about that
artist.""' 6 In contrast to the active "involve[ment in] contemporary art
and in the contemporary artistic community" of the plaintiffs' experts,
Judge Edelstein characterized Mr. Kramer's expertise as "myopic.' ' 17
Accordingly, the court found that the plaintiffs did have honor and
reputations worthy of protection and that these reputations would be
"damaged by 'intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification' of
10& See Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 312-13.
109. See i. at 314-16. A work of applied art is described by Judge Edelstein as
"two-and three-dimensional ornamentation or decoration that is affixed to otherwise
utilitarian objects." Id. at 315 (citing Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632
F.2d 989, 997 (2d Cir. 1980)). Works of applied art are not -works of visual art" as
defined by VARA in 17 U.S.C. § 101.
110. See Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 316-23. Works for hire are explicitly excluded from
the definition of "works of visual art." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The definition pertinent to
Carter of a work for hire is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment." Id.
111. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 323; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
112. See Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 323-24.
113. See idi.
114. See id. at 324.
115. See iL For an aptly named selection of Kramer's essays, see Hilton Kramer,
The Revenge of the Philistines: Art and Culture, 1972-1984 (1985).
116. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 324.
117. Id
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the Work."11
The court went on to consider whether the work was one of
"recognized stature" for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).1I9 As
an initial premise, the court observed that the recognized stature
provision was "preservative in nature," rather than a reputational
right, and that it recognized Congress's concern that "the destruction
of works of art represented a significant societal loss. ' ' 2' The
recognized stature provision was a "gate-keeping mechanism," by
which nuisance lawsuits were avoided and only art valued by society
was afforded protection against destruction. 121  Assessment of that
recognized stature should not be based on the subjective aesthetic
judgment of the trier of fact-rather, the trier of fact was to inquire
after the opinion of "art experts, the art community, or society in
general.'12  Adopting a plain meaning approach to the text of the
provision, and mindful of the provision's preservative intent, the court
established the two-part standard that has since been widely quoted:'23
Thus, for a work of visual art to be protected under this Section, a
plaintiff must make a two-tiered showing: (1) that the visual art in
question has "stature," i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that this
stature is "recognized" by art experts, other members of the artistic
community, or by some cross-section of society. 24
The standard would generally, "but not inevitably,"'" require the in-
court testimony of expert witnesses, who are to be drawn from the
ranks of those groups specified in the Kennedy Bill and any other
sources the court sees fit to consult. 26
Appearing to apply its own two-pronged test,'127 the court proceeded
to weigh the expert testimony before it and found the recognized
stature requirement satisfied. 8  Professor Darroll's testimony, as
characterized by the court, concerned his personal evaluation of the
work's stature rather than its appreciation in the community. 2 9 In
contrast, the testimony of Kent Barwick, president of the Municipal
Art Society of New York, and a former chairman of the New York
City Landmarks Preservation Commission, focused on the first
"recognized" prong of the standard; those who had seen the work on
one of the Municipal Art Society's tours of noteworthy works of art
118. Id.
119. See id. at 324-26.
120. Id. at 324.
121. Id. at 325.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 325 n.10.
127. See id. at 324-26.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 326.
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and architecture in New York "were anxious to have the tour of the
Work made a permanent part of the Society's tour schedule."'" In his
view, the public interest would be served by preservation of the work.
Professor Rosenblum again testified, based in part on the merits of
the work, which he declared "an incredible phenomenon," and in part
on its recognition by others.'
In finding the work to be of "recognized stature," Judge Edelstein
again discredited the testimony of the defendants' expert witness,
Hilton Kramer.132 Kramer testified that he found the work to be
without merit, remarking in an apparent play on the recognized
stature standard that the work was merely "a pastiche of recognized
cliches."'  Kramer's denunciation of the work backfired, however, as
it became clear that his distaste embraced almost all contemporary
art, for which he stated "the very notion of quality in art has been
discarded."' Opinions characterized by such lack of nuance were of
little probative value beside that of the plaintiffs' experts, "who are
intimately familiar with evolving standards in the area of
contemporary art."' s The judge's comments on the need for expert
testimony, his formulation of a two-pronged test for recognized
stature, and his insistence on the preservation rationale for the
provision have proved both influential and unfortunate.
In Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates.," the district
court dismissed an action brought under VARA by Pavia, a sculptor
whose work, The Ides of March, had been commissioned to adorn the
lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Manhattan. 37 Created in 1963, Pavia's
four-part sculpture was disassembled in 1988 and taken for reassembly
in the public lobby of a commercial warehouse in Queens.'- Only two
elements of the sculpture were shown at the warehouse, however, and
Pavia sued under the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law and
under VARA for intentional mutilation of the work.'39 Although
Pavia's claim fell under section 106A(a)(3)(A) of VARA, claiming
"intentional... mutilation... prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation" (and thus requiring no finding of recognized stature), the
court still made the factual finding that "'The Ides of March' was
recognized by critics and the news media as a noteworthy work of
130. Id. at 325-26.
131. Id at 325.
132. See id. at 326
133. Id.
134. Id at 326 n.13.
135. Id The Second Circuit reversed on the issue of whether the sculpture was a
work-for-hire. In doing so, the Court did not review the lower court's findings on
recognized stature. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 86-87 (2d Cir.
1995).
136. 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
137. See id at 623-24.
138. See id. at 624.
139. See id.; N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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art."1 40 This wording seems calculated to respond to a factual
requirement of recognized stature, though in its discussion of the
mutilation claim the court seems to realize that section 106A(a)(3)(A)
makes no such requirement. 1
Recognized stature under section 106A(a)(3)(B) was discussed in
more detail in an appeal from a state action brought under the
CAPA.' 42 The plaintiffs, Martin and Lorraine Lubner, lost much of
their life work as artists when a city garbage truck rolled down a hill
and destroyed their home. 43 The primary issue for the Lubners on
appeal was whether the state statute permitted a cause of action for
damages caused by negligence alone, and whether VARA preempted
the state action.1" Without deciding the issue of preemption, the
court examined the Lubners' claim under section 106(A)(a)(3)(B) and
found that, even if VARA preempted the state statute, the lack of
intentional or grossly negligent action on the part of the City absolved
it of liability.145 The question of recognized stature was an interesting
one for the court because the complete destruction of so many
undocumented artworks presented a potential problem of proof.46 In
this case, recognized stature was found by inference.1 47 The court
looked to evidence, excluded at trial on motions in limine, of the
Lubners' active forty-year careers as painters and art instructors.'48
Both painters showed that their work was widely exhibited in the
United States and Europe, and that it had entered both private and
public collections.149  VARA, however, requires that the work
destroyed, not the artist, be of recognized stature. 150 The court
resolved the problem by "[a]ccepting the Lubners' argument that they
are recognized artists who have created and exhibited their paintings
and drawings for over 40 years, we assume that their [destroyed] art
included works of recognized stature .... "I' The court's finding of
recognized stature by inference is a creative solution. It is doubtful,
however, that inferred recognized stature would have been so easily
accepted by this or any other court had the outcome of the case
depended on it.
140. Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 624, 627. The court dismissed the VARA claim on the
grounds that the acts of mutilation predated the effective date of VARA and thus
VARA did not apply. See id. at 628-29.
141. See id. at 627-28.
142. See Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
143. See id. at 26. Judge Nott commented that the case presented "a factual
scenario that seems to have been taken from a law school hypothetical." Id.
144. See id. at 27-29.
145. See id. at 29.
146. See id. at 26.
147. See id. at 29.
148. See id. at 26-27, 29.
149. See id. at 26.
150. See id. at 29.
151. Id.
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VARA was also invoked by six artists in a 1997 dispute over a
community garden in New York City." The City had sold the vacant
lot to the defendants for development under the City's affordable
housing program. 153 In the years before development began, a group
of local residents had transformed the lot with plantings and art for
public use.'-4 Artwork in the garden included murals on adjoining
walls, freestanding sculptures, and an ornamental pathway.155 The
plaintiffs claimed that the garden, as a conceptual whole, was a single
work of art, "an environmental sculpture," in the same way that the
entire lobby of the hotel in Carter constituted a single work, and that
alteration or removal of any part constituted violations of both
sections 106A(a)(3)(A) and (B). 56
The district court dismissed the complaint without deciding the
single work issue."5 If the garden were considered a single work of art
so that no element could be removed without destroying the whole,
Judge Baer argued, VARA would not apply, as the garden was
illegally cultivated on another's property without the owner's
consent.158 If the various works of art in the garden were considered
separable, then again VARA would not apply. The sculptures could
be removed without damage to the plaintiffs under the terms of the
Act. 59 The murals, although seriously obstructed by the proposed
development, would not be physically destroyed or mutilated."W
Although the plaintiffs had argued that "obliterating a visual artwork
from view is the equivalent of destroying it, and is actionable as a
matter of law," Judge Baer found no applicable law in support of the
proposition, and ultimately rejected it on the policy ground that to
find otherwise would "allow building owners to inhibit the
development of adjoining parcels of land by simply painting a mural
on the side of their building.' ' 61
In dicta, Judge Baer addressed the elements of honor and
reputation, and of recognized stature. 6' Both sides had offered an
expert witness, and the judge's findings on honor, reputation, and
recognized stature were based solely on a weighing of the credibility
of each side's experts, the critics Phyllis Tuchman for the defense and
Robert Costa for the plaintiffs."6  Judge Baer found Tuchman's
152. See English v. BFC & R East 11th Street LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446, 1997 WL
746444 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,1997), affd, 198 F.3d 233 (2d. Cir. 1999).
153. See id. at *1.
154. See id. at *1-'2.
155. See id at *1.
156. See id. at *3.
157. See id at *4.
158. See id at *4-*5.
159. See id. at *5.
160. See id at *6.
161. Id.
162 See id
163. See id.
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testimony more credible than Costa's, implying that if the case had
hinged on proof of damage to reputation or the recognized stature of
the art, the court would have found for the defendants.16" The judge's
confidence in Costa was evidently compromised when Costa
speculated that the peeling of paint on one of the murals was not a
condition problem, but rather an integral part of the mural's theme of
decay in nature.161 In evaluating expert evidence, the judge was
ultimately forced to evaluate competing experts' testimony based on
the credibility of their aesthetic theories.
Murals were again the subject of an action under VARA in a case
decided in Ventura, California, in June 1998.116 The plaintiff, M. B.
Hanrahan, and a large group of neighborhood children painted a
twelve-by-seventy-two-foot mural on the exterior wall of a liquor
store using an anti-drug, alcohol, and smoking theme as part of a
community improvement plan. 67 Three years later, the storeowners
whitewashed half of the mural and replaced it with a painted
advertisement for the store."6 Finding for the plaintiff, Judge Paez
awarded damages and an injunction to permit the artist to restore the
mural.169 Hanrahan had brought suit under both the mutilation and
destruction clauses of section 106A(a)(3). 70 Despite the humble
origins of the mural, there was ample evidence of recognized stature
and damage to honor and reputation. The mural was chosen in 1996
as one of fifty winners in a national contest for youth-oriented projects
aimed at drug and alcohol abuse, in connection with which
photographs were displayed at the U.S. Capitol in Washington.' The
destruction of the mural prompted much local media coverage, and
local residents held a rally in support of the work. 72 Thus, recognized
stature was found based on national and local community reaction,
with little reference to the world of professional art criticism. The
political content, far from undermining the aesthetic stature of the
work, situated the work in the mainstream of contemporary art, and
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 97-CV-7470 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998), Intel.
Prop. Litig. Rep., July 8, 1998, at 3.
167. See id. For an illustration of the mural, see Robin J. Dunitz & James Prigoff,
Painting the Towns: Murals of California 142 (1997).
168. See Hanrahan, Intell. Prop. Litig. Rep., vol. 4, no. 23, at 3.
169. See id. The artist was awarded $15,000 in damages, $15,000 to restore the
mural, and attorney's fees and costs of approximately $18,000. See id.
170. See Steve Chawkins, A Line in the Paint; Ventura Muralist fights Obliteration
of one of her Works by Store Owner, L.A. Times (Ventura County ed.), June 29, 1998,
at Bi; Robert Rootenberg, Art Preservation Case Compensates Ventura Muralist in
Paint-over Case, Mural Conservancy of Los Angeles (MCLA) Newsletter, (Summer
1998) (visited Dec. 1, 1999) <http://www.lamurals.org/MCLA/MCLANewsletter.
html>.
171. See Robin Dunitz, Murals under Attack, in MCLA Newsletter, supra note 170.
172. See Rootenberg, supra note 170.
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supported a finding of recognized stature.'73
The most recent case to be decided invoking VARA is Martin v.
City of Indianapolis.74 Martin is a sculptor of significant local repute,
and an employee of the Tarpenning-Lafollette Company, designers
and manufacturers of metal objects.75 Over a period of two-and-a-
half years, Martin created a large metal sculpture named "Symphony
K1.",176 His employer provided some assistance in the creation of the
work as well as a site on its land for the completed sculpture, but the
work was made on Martin's own time and, as the court later
determined, was not a work-for-hire."n The site was granted after
obtaining a zoning variance from the City.78 Under the terms of the
variance, the City was to give Martin and Lafollette ninety days in
which to remove the sculpture should it no longer be compatible with
the existing land use or if the acquisition of the property on which it
stood became necessary.1 79 Four years later, the City did indeed
acquire the land for redevelopment and, despite the artist's repeated
offers to donate Symphony #1 to the City and to aid in its removal to
another site, the City demolished the sculpture.'
Martin filed suit pursuant to section 106A(a)(3)(B), claiming that
the defendants had intentionally destroyed the work.'," On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the defendants argued inter alia that
Martin had failed to prove by admissible evidence that Symphony #1
was a "work of recognized stature."1' The City asserted that Martin's
proof, which was exclusively documentary and included no in-court
testimony, was inadmissible hearsay.-' Martin had proffered
newspaper and magazine articles and other materials, which showed
that the model for Symphony #1 had been awarded the "Best of
Show" in a local art show, that the Indiana Arts Commission
173. On the prevalence of political subject matter in contemporary art, see James
Gardner, Culture or Trash? A Provocative View of Contemporary Painting,
Sculpture, and Other Costly Commodities 147-69 (1993) (decrying the strong
emergence of political art in the late 1980s and 1990s, and the shift from interest in the
art to its meaning and the cause it propounds).
174. 982 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1997), and 4 F. Supp. 2d SOS (S.D. Ind. 1998), affd,
192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999). See generally Sonia Tara Banerji, Recent Developments
in Law and Policy under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Martin v. City of
Indianapolis and the Problem of Unwanted Art, 9 Windsor Rev. Legal Soc. Issues 99
(1999) (analyzing Martin and proposing an "Alternative Placement" rule for removal
of site-specific art); Molly McDonough, Beauty of Art-Shield Law in Eye of Beholder,
Chi. Daily L. Bull., Nov. 30, 1998, at 3 (discussing the district court opinion in Martin).
175. See Martin, 982 F. Supp. at 628.
176. See id
177. See id at 628, 632-35.
178. See id at 628.
179. See Martin, 192 F.3d at 610.
180. See id. at 611.
181. See Martin, 982 F. Supp. at 630.
182. 1d; see also Banerji, supra note 174, at 117-19.
183. See Martin, 982 F. Supp. at 630.
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Quarterly had featured Symphony #1 in an article on art in Indiana
public spaces, and that the construction and completion of the
sculpture had been favorably received."8 Martin also offered letters
from the Director of the Herron Gallery of the Herron School of Art
at Indiana University, Indianapolis, from an art critic of the
Indianapolis Star, and a letter to the editor of a local newspaper in
support of the work."
In granting the plaintiff's motion, Judge Barker held that the
statements were not hearsay, as they were not offered for the truth of
the matters asserted, i.e. that Symphony #1 had inherent merit.1 86
Rather, they were offered to show that art critics, professors, and the
public noticed the work and that they considered it a newsworthy
work of art."8 The court noted Carter's two-pronged interpretation of
recognized stature,1 8 although it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the
court applied such a test, for in its brief discussion of Martin's
evidence the court made no attempt to identify which exhibits tended
to prove each of the two elements.18 9 For Judge Barker, the Carter
test seems merely to have served as a useful reminder that "[t]he
critical element of 'recognized stature' involves community opinion
about Martin's work, not a determination that Martin's work is
inherently meritorious.1"'I
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the City challenged Judge
Barker's holding on the recognized stature evidence. 191 The court in a
2-1 decision found for Martin and affirmed the district court ruling19Y
Noting the plaintiff's contention that the Carter two-pronged test
"may be more rigorous than Congress intended," Judge Harlington
Wood, writing for the majority, accepted the test for the purpose of
the decision.193 The documentary evidence was admissible to show
that Symphony #1 had not gone unnoticed and that the writers
considered the work meritorious.194 Judge Manion dissented.' 95 He
too accepted the Carter two-pronged test for recognized stature. 96
But for Judge Manion, the test presented an insuperable problem for
claimants proffering only documentary evidence and eschewing expert
testimony.97 If the evidence were admitted only to prove that the
184. See id. at 631.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 630.
187. See id.
188. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
189. See Martin, 982 F. Supp. at 631.
190. Id. at 630.
191. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999).
192. See id. at 614.
193. Id. at 612.
194. See id. at 612-13.
195. See id. at 615-16 (Manion, J., dissenting).
196. See id. (Manion, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 616 (Manion, J., dissenting).
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work of art was recognized and thus not admitted for the truth of the
facts asserted (i.e. "that the art in question was good or bad"), then
the second prong of the Carter test, that the work had stature,
remained unproven, at least for the high standards required for
summary judgment. 198  For Judge Manion, expert testimony was
always necessary to prove recognized stature, except in those rare
cases when "something of unquestioned recognition and stature was
destroyed."'' 1
Pervading Judge Manion's opinion is his reading of the purpose of
VARA, his disdain for Symphony #1, and his sympathy for
traditional, non-moral property rights. For Manion, "VARA was not
designed to regulate urban renewal, but to protect great works of art
from destruction and mutilation, among other things.""z  Evidence
indicative of stature was evidence that the artwork "met a certain high
level of quality."'" The recognized stature clause was intended to
present more than just a deterrent to nuisance suits, but was rather a
significant limitation on the right to protection under VARA. Given
such a reading of the statute, it is not surprising that Judge Manion
would require more in defense to a motion of summary judgment than
Martin provided. Judge Manion concluded that the majority decision
posed real dangers to the purchasers or donees of art, who risked
becoming the "perpetual curator of a piece of visual art that has lost
(or perhaps never had) its luster."' Judge Manion counseled the
obtaining of waivers to avoid liability for the statutory $20,000 for "art
of questionable value.""
The few cases brought under VARA or the relevant state statutes
reveal a predictably inconsistent application of the recognized
stature/recognized quality standard. The courts are divided on the
level of proof required. Thus, in Lubner, works of recognized stature
were inferred from careers of recognized stature;2 in Martin, purely
documentary evidence satisfied the standard. 5 and the Carter court
considered in-court expert testimony a virtual requirement. 21 These
cases illustrate that while judges are aware that their role is not that of
art critic, they must often struggle with classifying art that is large-
scale, politically charged, and aesthetically challenging. Furthermore,
198. See id. (Manion, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Manion, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 615 (Manion, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 616 (Manion, J., dissenting).
202. Id (Manion, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Manion, J., dissenting).
204. See Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 29 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
205. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625, 630-31 (S.D. Ind. 1997);
supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
206. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
supra notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
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the cases reveal significant problems with determining who qualifies
as an art world expert, and how to evaluate an expert's testimony
without resorting to personal aesthetic bias. The standard, however,
has rarely been the central issue in reported cases. To present a fuller
picture of the problems inherent in the standard, therefore, a few of
the published disputes and settled cases must be examined.
B. Disputes
Most disputes involving VARA and state moral rights statutes are
settled before trial, not least because of the relatively modest damages
available. The disputes that attract the attention of the press
predominantly concern large-scale sculpture and murals.
1. Sculpture
Given the large size and site-specificity of much commissioned
sculpture, it is unsurprising that VARA disputes frequently involve
damage to or destruction of sculpture. For example, a Florida artist
invoked VARA in his long-running dispute with The Art and Cultural
Center of Hollywood ("Center") near Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 7
Marc Leviton is an artist who creates sculptures with found objects
such as auto parts, plumbing fixtures, and scrap wiring.20 8 In 1995, he
was the Artist in Residence at the Center, maintaining a studio there
and using the grounds for storage of his finished works and elements
for future sculptures."1° Responding to neighborhood complaints, the
City issued a five-day notice to remove the "junk" from the grounds
or face a code violation.21 The Director of the Center ordered the
objects gathered and removed. 1
Leviton sued the Center for destroying his art works under section
106A(a)(3)(B) of VARA.212  In pre-trial publicity, the issue of
recognized stature was much discussed.213 Counsel for the defendant
stated to the press that Leviton, a retired New York electrician, was
not an artist meriting protection under VARA.2 14  He had never
submitted his creations to peer review, had not entered juried
competitions, and had not received established critical acclaim.215 The
Director insisted that no works were disassembled, and that the only
207. See Paul Brinkley-Rogers, Law Protecting Rights of Artists to Face Test, Miami
Herald, Mar. 11, 1999, at 1A; Sean Rowe, You Call This Art and Culture?, New Times
Broward-Palm Beach, Mar. 26, 1998 (News); supra note 2.
208. See Cazares, supra note 2.
209. See id.
210. See Brinkley-Rogers, supra note 207.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
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objects junked were some of the artist's raw materials-"'bicycle
parts, shovels, different metal parts with jagged edges."'' 6  The
plaintiff, however, noted that the defendant valued his work highly
enough to appoint him Artist in Residence and even now kept one of
his works in its permanent collection.27 The former director of the
Center was quoted as calling Leviton "an up-and-coming
representative South Florida artist."'2' 8  Furthermore, Leviton had
photographs of the completed works which, he says, the Center
destroyed, thus enabling expert opinion on the recognized quality of
the destroyed pieces.219 The case is still awaiting trial. -0
The Leviton dispute is but one example of the application of
VARA to the destruction of large-scale sculpture. -1 The highly
visible nature of large-scale sculpture encourages impassioned views.
The Leviton dispute is also indicative of the problem of distinguishing
between the recognized stature of a work of art and the publicity
surrounding its demise.
2. Murals
If large-scale sculpture has proved a fertile area of interpretation of
VARA, the other major area is the mural. Before the enactment of
VARA, destruction of murals was the catalyst to unsuccessful
attempts at establishing through the courts a moral right or its
equivalent. For example, in the 1949 case Crimi v. Rutgers
Presbyterian Church in New York tm the court found that the artist
had no right to prevent the mutilation or destruction of his mural once
the painting was completed and paid for."? It is not surprising that the
216. Rowe, supra note 207 (quoting the former director of the Center).
217. See Brinkley-Rogers, supra note 207.
218. Id
219. See id.
220. In January 2000, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that VARA was unconstitutional due in part to the vagueness of the term "recognized
stature." Telephone Interview with Ronald P. Ponzoli, counsel for the defendant(Feb. 23, 2000). For examples of settled cases in which recognized stature was an
issue of importance, see Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights and Real Life Artists, 15
Hastings Comm. & Ent. LJ. 929,941-42 (1993).
221. For other cases involving sculpture, see supra notes 10741, 174-203 and
accompanying text.
222. 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
223. See id at 819. One of the few cases brought under the Massachusetts Art
Preservation Act ("MAPA") concerned the destruction of a mural. In Moakley r.
Eastivick, an artist sued under MAPA for the destruction of a mural located in a
church. 666 N.E.2d 505, 505-06 (Mass. 1996). The Brockton Superior Court
(unpublished decision) found that the art was protected by MAPA, but that
application of the Act offended the constitutional right to freedom of religion and
worship. See id at 506-07. Recognized quality was proved by the testimony of
Catherine Mayes, director of a Newton gallery. See Sandy Coleman, Shaping a Case
for Artists' Rights, Boston Globe, Sept. 13, 1991, at 25. The Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed on the ground that the act did not apply to art created before the date on
1959
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change came first in California. In California, murals have long been
an important element of visual culture, in part due to the reliable
climate, but also to the dominance of the automobile.224 The first case
brought under the California Art Preservation Act of 1979 ("CAPA")
concerned a large external mural by Kent Twitchell entitled "Old
Woman of the Freeway," a favorite of motorists on the Hollywood
Freeway near downtown Los Angeles."z When the new owners of the
hotel on which the mural was painted whitewashed the wall in 1986,
the artist, aided by public outcry, sued under CAPA and was awarded
$175,000.216
Inspired by this example, litigation over the destruction or
defacement of murals citing CAPA and VARA is now frequent in
California. In 1991, disputes arose over the defacement of murals
painted by professional artists with the aid of school children in San
Diego elementary schools.2 7 In Los Angeles, Hanrahan v. Ramirez,
in which the plaintiff painted a mural on the exterior wall of a liquor
store, is unusual only in that it was not settled.2 Ironically, the City's
concern for the visual environment has precipitated several disputes.
In a program to combat the practice of "tagging," the spraying of
generally gang-related graffiti on neighborhood walls, city agencies
paint over the tags, sometimes obliterating murals beneath.229 City
agencies were allegedly responsible for the fate of "The Wall That
Cracked Open," a mural by Willie Herron, depicting the stabbing of
his brother by gang members.23° Whatever the other merits of
Herron's case, the artist should have no problem proving recognized
stature. Los Angeles is considered the preeminent home of mural art
which the law became effective. See Moakley, 666 N.E.2d at 508.
224. See Patt Morrison, Defending the Mural Capital of America, L.A. Times, Apr.
5, 1998 (Magazine), at 7 (referring to the advantages for exterior mural painting in the
hot, dry climate of the Los Angeles area).
225. See Shauna Snow, Homecoming for Lady of the Freeway, L.A. Times, Mar. 20,
1992, at Fl. The mural is reproduced in Dunitz & Prigoff, supra note 167, at 157.
226. See Snow, supra note 225, at Fl. Restoration of the mural began in the Spring
of 1999. See George Ramos, Freeway Lady is Returning Artwork, L.A. Times (Orange
County ed.), Apr. 25, 1999, at A16.
227. See Teri Sforza, $500,000 Claim Filed in School Censorship Case, San Diego
Union, Oct. 3, 1991, at B-2; Teri Sforza, Some Murals Have People Climbing the
Walls, San Diego Union, July 22, 1991, at B-1.
228. See Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 97-CV-7470 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1998), Intell.
Prop. Litig. Rep., July 8, 1998, at 3; supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text. In
Botello v. Shell Oil Co., the California Court of Appeal reviewed a grant for summary
judgment in favor of the defendant who argued in an action brought under CAPA
after the destruction of a mural that a mural was not a "painting" under CAPA and
was therefore beyond the protection of the Act. 280 Cal. Rptr. 535, 536 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991). The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. See id. at 540. The case was
subsequently settled, such that no finding concerning "recognized quality" was made.
See Shauna Snow, Mural Group Claims Victory, L.A. Times, July 18, 1992, at F4.
229. See Lorenza Mufloz, Distinctive L.A. Art Legacy Under Siege, L.A. Times,
July 23, 1999, at Al.
230. See id.
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in America, especially Chicano murals.2 Furthermore, the
established art community holds Herron's mural in high esteem: Max
Benavidez, a vice chancellor at the University of California Los
Angeles and an art historian and critic, has been quoted as saying: "As
far as murals are concerned, [Herron's 'Wall'] was a landmark art
piece in Los Angeles. This was the great signifier of Chicano art, and
the fact that it has been destroyed is a great tragedy for the art world
and our community."2 32
More interestingly, recognized stature in that case might be
provable by reference to the local Chicano community, which is the
subject of the mural. Herron's mural, like many murals, was a
peculiarly community work.23 Friends aided in the creation of the
mural,' and its subject, "the physical and psychic violence
surrounding many disenfranchised youth," was a crucial concern of
the immediate community s The mural's exposed position ensured
its incorporation into the daily life of the community- Under such
circumstances, the Carter court's finding that courts may look not only
to art experts and other members of the artistic community for
evidence that the stature is recognized, but also to "some cross-section
of society," would surely be relevant.' -7
In San Francisco, VARA rights are increasingly cited in disputes
over murals. In a recently reported dispute, the new owners of a hotel
in the low-income Tenderloin district announced plans to paint over a
1992 mural, "The Leap of Compassion," by local artist Paul
Scofield.2 38 The mural, located on the exterior wall of an apartment
building, had been commissioned by the previous owner of the hotel
over whose pool and courtyard the building looms. 39 Painted to
benefit a local youth project, the mural has the support of local
residents and activists, many of whom came to the mural's
unveiling.2 ° Again, local support might be decisive on the issue of
231. See id.; see also Michael Quintanilla, Once Bustling, Now Bust, LA. Tues,
Dec. 25, 1998, at El (describing the threat to famous Latino murals on the walls of
failing clothing store); Brenda Rees, Talking Walls: A Guide to LA.'s Vast Collection
of Murals, Where Artists Paint Snapshots of History and Hope, LA. Times, Apr. 16,
1998, at F6 (listing some of the more famous murals in Los Angeles). For
reproductions of major Los Angeles murals, see Dunitz & Prigoff, supra note 167, at
148-235. The Mural Conservancy of Los Angeles ("MCLA") is an active volunteer
organization publicizing artists' rights under CAPA and VARA. See supra note 170.
232. Mufioz, supra note 229.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303,325 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
238. See Sheila Muto, Muralists See the Writing on the Wall: It's a Billboard, Wall
St. J. (Cal.), July 14,1999, at CA1.
239. See id.
240. See id. The value of exterior walls as advertising space is fueling many of the
recent VARA disputes over murals. See id. In another recent case, a VARA suit was
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recognized stature.
Finally, in one of the largest settlements yet under VARA, plaintiffs
are to receive $200,000 for the destruction of their 1986 Mission
District mural "Lilli Ann."24' The four-story-high painting was
whitewashed in July 1998 by the new owners of the building, who
claim that they were unaware that their purchase of the building did
not include rights to the mural.242  Again, recognized stature would
have been easily proved. San Francisco is a major center of mural art,
and the Mission District in particular is known for its murals.243
Furthermore, the destroyed mural was "'at the nexus of two major
trends in the art world: the Mexican muralist tradition and the San
Francisco muralist tradition,"' and was beloved by the local Latino
community, especially because one of the two artists who executed the
mural trained under assistants to the great muralist Diego Rivera.24'
In examining the case law and reported disputes under VARA and
state moral rights statutes for evidence of the application and
interpretation of the recognized stature/recognized quality standard
for destroyed works of art, the record is thin and patchy. While
analysis of those statutory provisions is not extensive, their invocation
has grown more prevalent within the last few years.2 45 The cases and
disputes reveal an inconsistent application of the recognized stature
standard that springs, at least in part, from idiosyncratic readings of
VARA, the policies embodied within it, and its application to art of
widely varying genesis, aim, and pretension. The violent interaction
avoided over a mural entitled "Extinct" on the exterior wall of a hotel when the
owner, wishing to lease the wall to a billboard company, agreed to allow the artist to
recreate the mural on another wall of the hotel. See id. The mural is reproduced in
Dunitz & Prigoff, supra note 167, at 69.
241. Campusano v. Cort, No. 98-3001 (N.D. Cal. filed July 31, 1998). See Torri Still,
Artists vs. Landlords. Battles are Brewing in S.F Over Muralists' Right to Preserve
Their Work Versus Landlords' Property Rights, Recorder, Nov. 2, 1999, at 1. The
mural is reproduced in Dunitz & Prigoff, supra note 167, at 73.
242. An ancillary suit remains, Cort Trust v. Lilli Ann Corp., in which the new
owners claim damages from the previous owners for failing to disclose that they did
not own the mural and had not painted it themselves. See Still, supra note 241.
243. See Timothy W. Drescher, San Francisco Bay Area Murals: Communities
Create Their Muses 1904-1997, at 7, 19-28 (expanded 3d ed. 1998).
244. Still, supra note 241 (quoting the artists' attorney). Other cities in the United
States known for the quality and quantity of their public murals have launched
programs which, when cited in VARA legislation, may provide significant evidence of
"recognized stature." Philadelphia, as part of its 1984 Mural Arts Program designed
to combat graffiti, commissioned almost 1800 murals. See Todd Pitock, Off-the-Wall
Philadelphia, Globe & Mail (Toronto), Apr. 21, 1999, at D12. The City has begun
guided tours of those murals it considers the most important. See id. Chicago has a
similar, but more modest, program. See id.
245. An indication of the slow growth in VARA litigation is seen by comparing the
case law discussed in the present Note with the only slightly smaller case law in Simon
J. Frankel, VARA's First Five Years, 19 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 1 (1996)
(discussing cases brought under VARA and the issues of preemption of state law and
of waiver).
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of artistic creation with the practical world of zoning, urban
development, social protest, community values, or changing fashion
undermines the credibility of the statute in its protection of private
and societal interests. The next part analyzes the application of
VARA in these cases and disputes against the goals of the statute.
III. ANALYSIS OF RECOGNIZED STATURE
Academics, practitioners, and artists greeted the enactment of
VARA in 1990 with a storm of criticism, tempered only by the relief
that some form of federal moral rights legislation, however imperfect,
had entered the United States Code.2 6 The criticism was of two types.
The first attack focused on the theoretical, pointing to limitations in
the Act's scope and its imperfect application of Berne principlesY 7
The second criticism was focused on the pragmatic, pointing to the
difficulties inherent in applying a compromise Act of this type.2 s The
recognized stature standard was among the provisions most keenly
criticized.249 The paucity of case law under VARA to date requires
that analysis of the Act remains to some extent theoretical3- The
existing cases and disputes do, however, allow some testing of
VARA's recognized stature provision against experience.
A. Recognized Stature in VARA as a Copyright Measure
There is no evidence that the enactment of VARA serves the
copyright policy of encouraging the creation or dissemination of art.
In theory, the assurance of future control over the condition of a work
of art should encourage artists to create, as the artist may count on the
beneficial effects on his future career of a visible successful work, and
he may have the peace of mind that his efforts will be preserved for
posterity.25' There may be some validity to this idea in the decision to
disseminate a work already created. It would be a sterile
interpretation of the creative impulse, however, to suppose that
246. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 30, at 428-29 (arguing that the waiver provision
in VARA greatly weakens its impact).
247. See, e.g., Damich, supra note 22, at 947-48 (claiming that although the
enactment of VARA was a victory for artists, United States law was still not in
conformity with the Berne Convention).
248. See, e.g., Karlen, supra note 84, at 906-07 (providing a point-by-point critique
of VARA).
249. See, e.g., Damich, supra note 22, at 962-63 ("Limiting the right against
destruction to works of recognized stature is inconsistent with moral rights theory, the
Berne Convention, and the United States copyright law tradition of refraining fromjudgments as to quality."); Davis, supra note 38, at 354-57 (discussing the difficulty of
establishing a consistent standard); Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 480 n.19 ("[Tlhe
reference to 'recognized stature' is regrettable."); Karlen, supra note 84, at 916-17
(outlining the aesthetic and temporal problems with the standard).
250. See supra Part II.A.
251. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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concern for the future physical integrity of a work has much impact on
the creation of a work of art in most cases. Case law and the public
reporting of disputes show that most applications of VARA are to
works created for and already launched into the public sphere. The
plaintiffs in Carter"' and Pavia53 created their sculptures as works-
for-hire or on commission, circumstances quite sufficient to ensure
their completion without the benefit of VARA protection. Similarly,
the cooperative and impassioned genesis of many murals or
community gardens, created in the face of far more unfavorable
conditions than a lack of VARA protection, has little to do with
traditional copyright purposes. 4  Even if it were conceded that
VARA protection may encourage creation of art, one could rationally
argue that the recognized stature standard discourages the creation of
art of quality or potential importance, for only art of such quality risks
complete destruction without VARA protection.
Indeed, there is evidence that the threat of a VARA suit if a waiver
is not obtained has discouraged the commission or installation of
large-scale artwork. 5  Fear of future VARA litigation has similarly
reduced tolerance for ad hoc community projects such as
unauthorized murals and community gardens, prompting rapid
destruction of such art before the art can attain recognized stature,
with a resultant impoverishment of art "dissemination."
On the other hand, if VARA should be seen as the introduction of
the quintessentially European natural right of the artist to the fruits of
his effort and skill, then the recognized stature provision is an
anomaly. As the framers of VARA acknowledged, there is little
validity to the argument that the complete destruction of an artist's
work of art results in no harm to his honor or reputation.25 6  If
destruction of an artist's work results in the same harm to his honor
and reputation as mutilation of the work, there is no justification for
treating the damage differently. 57  Reputations are formed by
252. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affJd in part,
vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1208 (1996). See supra
notes 107-35 and accompanying text.
253. Pavia v. 1120 Avenue. of the Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); see supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 152-65 and accompanying text; Part II.B.2.
255. See, e.g., Bob Keefer, Carving Out a Career: A Creswell Sculptor Earns a
Living by Creating Fine but Functional Knives, Eugene Register-Guard, July 3, 1994,
at 1F (discussing Oregon State System of Higher Education requirement for waiver of
VARA rights before purchase of art); Mary McLachlin, County wants Artists to give
up their Rights, Palm Beach Post, June 20, 1997, at 1A (detailing announcement by
Palm Beach County to insist on waiver of VARA rights before purchase or receipt by
gift of artwork); Muto, supra note 238 (citing a recent example of a building owner
deciding not to commission a mural on being informed of VARA).
256. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6926 ("[T]he preservation model ... recognizes that destruction of works of art has a
detrimental effect on the artist's reputation ... .
257. See id.
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cumulative weight-an artist's entire oeuvre-as much as by
individually significant pieces. Art is subject to the vagaries of
fashion, and today's insignificant work may be a seminal work for a
future movement.
Despite the decision that current United States law was generally
adequate for Berne adherence, Congress continued to develop moral
rights legislation for visual artists?-3 The effort was predicated on the
unique relationship between the artist and the physical object of his
creation. 9 Protection of derivative works is impotent if the original is
a unique object, no longer in the artist's possession.O Unlike other
works of authorship, the primary market value in a painting or
sculpture usually lies in the original created object, not in its
derivatives.261 If a legitimate imbalance in the exploitable value of a
work existed in pre-VARA copyright law, however, its correction is
severely compromised when work lacking recognized stature is
excluded.
Perhaps the most controversial element of the recognized stature
standard is that it requires courts for the first time in copyright law to
make distinctions based on aesthetic considerations.21 In Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., Judge Holmes warned of the dangers
of expecting judges or juries to make balanced decisions on aesthetic
merit.3 One might argue that the Act merely requires courts to
weigh expert evidence, as they might in a medical malpractice suit. It
would be naive, however, to expect that every trier of fact, even with
the aid of expert testimony, would remain immune to his or her
aesthetic taste. Moreover, as a question of fact, findings of recognized
stature are to be accorded high deference on review, theoretically
making them virtually unappealable.
258. See id at 6918.
259. See id at 6918-19.
260. See id. at 6918. "A derivative work consists of a contribution of original
material to a pre-existing work so as to recast, transform or adapt the pre-existing
work." 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 3.03 (1999).
261. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
262. Copyright law generally requires only a modicum of creativity to satisfy the
originality requirement. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340,362-64 (1991).
263. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
264. See id. at 251-52.
265. In practice, however, appeals courts increasingly review findings of fact in
some copyright cases de novo. See 3 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 260, § 12.12
(discussing Second Circuit's review of substantial similarity in infringement cases
under a de novo standard); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech
and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 Yale Li. 2431, 2461-62
(1998) (discussing circuits that already practice independent appellate review in
copyright cases implicating the First Amendment). Professor Jane Ginsburg raised
the issue of standard of review for a per se recognized stature standard in the VARA
hearings. See H.R. 2670 Hearing, supra note 93, at 88 ("Is 'recognized stature' a
question of law or of fact? Can it be resolved at the summary judgment stage? From
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As a copyright measure, therefore, the recognized stature standard
is both theoretically and practically flawed. It fails to encourage the
creation and dissemination of art and compromises the right of an
artist to the integrity of his product and his reputation. Finally, it
obliges courts to consider aesthetic quality, if only in the form of
competing aesthetic evaluations by experts, in a manner antithetical to
traditional copyright law.
B. Recognized Stature as a Preservation Measure
Protection under CAPA and VARA against the destruction, as
opposed to mutilation, of works of art is largely motivated by the
societal interest in preserving the cultural patrimony.266 Yet the desire
to accommodate moral rights legislation to the traditional
expectations of property owners and the art market makes VARA a
flawed vehicle for the enforcement of that interest for several
reasons.
267
First, VARA provides a cause of action only to the artist of the
work during his lifetime, a shorter period than provided for in CAPA
and under the early versions of VARA.26 Second, no equivalent of
the perpetual public interest cause of action in the California CACPA
exists in VARA. 269 Thus, the vast bulk of art of recognized stature in
the United States remains unprotected from mutilation or destruction
by an owner.
If, as the Register of Copyrights suggested,27 ° the purpose of the
recognized stature standard is to acknowledge that the national
interest is served by treating works of greater artistic merit with
greater respect, then the recognized stature standard should be more
than a mere gate-keeping mechanism.27 No evidence supports a
the bill's reference to expert testimony, it would appear the standard is factual.").
Unlike CAPA or VARA, the Massachusetts Moral Rights Statute states that
"recognized quality" is a question of law. See Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 231, § 85S (Law.
Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1999). Perhaps the only true equivalent to aesthetic judgments
in jurisprudence are moral judgments. For example, the finding of fact that a
pornographic work has "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" is a
defense to an obscenity charge. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See Amy
M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1359
(1990) (arguing that the "serious artistic value" standard is obsolete); Karlen, supra
note 20, at 696 n.132 (comparing recognized stature provision with defense to
obscenity).
266. See supra notes 38-40, 45 and accompanying text (CAPA); notes 41-43, 99 and
accompanying text (VARA).
267. See Morton, supra note 107, at 907-11.
268. See supra notes 46, 81 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text; see also Morton, supra note 107,
at 914-15 (describing CACPA and noting absence of similar provision in VARA).
270. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
271. Judge Manion adopted the position that the recognized stature provision
should be more than a mere gate-keeping mechanism. See Martin v. City of
Indianapolis, 192 F.3d, 608, 615-16 (7th Cir. 1999) (Manion, J., dissenting); supra
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contention that VARA has protected any work currently
acknowledged as artistically significant.' While it may be true that
VARA may act as a deterrent to the contemplated destruction of art
of recognized stature, the Act is currently so little known or
understood by owners (with the possible exception of landlords) that
the deterrent argument is weakenedPr
The case law and published disputes reveal that the Act is
increasingly invoked to protect work of minimal artistic or societal
value-indeed in some cases VARA may hamper efforts to protect
the visual environment, as much an element of cultural patrimony as
an individual work of art"4  Unsurprisingly, the mutilation or
destruction of highly visible art in public or semi-public spaces
generates a disproportionately large amount of VARA litigation. The
court's reluctance to act as arbiter in questions of aesthetics, however,
has led to an undue emphasis on the "recognized" element of the
standard.75 A work that is simply highly visible due to its size and
location may always be found to fulfill the recognized stature
standard.276 This result is facilitated by an unfortunate observation by
the Carter court. In a footnote, Judge Edelstein notes that "VARA
does not delineate when a work must attain 'recognized stature' in
order to be entitled to protection .... .2  Suggesting that this
"omission" is deliberate, given the preservative goal of section
106A(a)(3)(B), Judge Edelstein strongly implies that a work may
attain recognized stature after the VARA suit is filed and still fulfil
the terms of the provision.278 The publicity surrounding the filing of a
VARA suit may alone be sufficient to provide evidence of recognized
stature. While this deference to public opinion is laudable, it opens
the judicial process to a significant risk of manipulation, where the
connected or media-experienced plaintiff can manufacture
"recognized stature" overnight in the course of a trial.
If the protection in VARA against destruction of works of art
notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
272. Congressman Markey, in his remarks before Congress in sponsorship of
VARA, invoked the case of a dismembered Picasso print to underscore the problem
VARA was designed to combat. See 136 Cong. Rec. 12,609 (1990). No work by an
artist even approaching Picasso's stature has been cited in VARA litigation.
Ironically, VARA would not have protected the Picasso print because the artist was
no longer alive.
273. It might be argued that no deterrent is needed to protect work of recognized
stature because such works are generally protected by their significant resale value for
the owner on the art market. This reasoning may be valid in a healthy market.
When, however, the market is less buoyant and auction houses less liberal in their
consignment policies, the economic incentive argument loses force.
274. An example is the Los Angeles anti-graffiti program. See supra note 229; see
also Banerji, supra note 174, at 128-35 (discussing the problem of unwanted art).
275. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
276. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
277. Carter v. Helnsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
278. See id. at 325 & n.12.
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responds to a societal interest in preserving society's artistic output,
then the recognized stature standard threatens to betray that interest.
By setting the standard too high, courts risk the destruction of the
unrecognized masterwork; by setting it too low, courts risk alienating
those forced to live with art they may despise, and whose legitimate
property interests are curtailed.
C. Problems of Application of the Recognized Stature Standard
Despite the theoretical shortcomings of VARA, application of the
statute has not always been complicated. Where the recognized
stature standard has been an issue, courts have been creative in
finding the standard fulfilled, even in the absence of expert
testimony. 9 In resolved disputes, recognized stature has been easily
shown when the work of art was purchased, commissioned, or was a
prize in a charity auction.2" The fact that the owner selected the work
from among others and paid value for it is frequently enough to prove
recognized quality or stature.2 l
Some practical issues of application of the recognized stature
standard have arisen, however. First, the two-pronged standard
enunciated by the Carter court and since widely quoted,28 if not
always carefully applied, is problematic. The test requires that the
plaintiff show that the work of art has stature, "i.e. is viewed as
meritorious," and that the stature is "'recognized' by art experts, other
members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of
society." 3 While a close textual interpretation in which the two-word
test is divided into a two-part test is attractive, it is not logically
necessary and leads to technical evidentiary problems. There is
nothing in the wording of the statute, nor in the accompanying House
Report, that requires a finding that a work be viewed as "meritorious"
for the work to qualify for protection against destruction." The Act
was designed to guard against precisely this kind of aesthetic
judgement on the part of art owners.285 Stature alone is meaningless
unless the stature is recognized. Similarly, if a work of art is widely
recognized, it is either famous or notorious-either way it has
279. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612-13 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding recognized stature based solely on newspaper articles, letters, and
catalogues).
280. See Karlen, supra note 220, at 941-42.
281. See id. Karlen finds the defendant effectively "estopped" from asserting a lack
of recognized quality or stature when he purchased or commissioned the work, or
when the work is the result of a competition or public bidding. See id.
282. See Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
283. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325.
284. See supra Part I.B.2.
285. See 135 Cong. Rec. 12,252 (1989) ("We have all heard the horror stories about
paint being removed from sculpture, murals painted over, paintings altered."
(statement of Sen. Kasten)).
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recognized stature. To require, as the Carter test does, a finding that
the work is considered meritorious is to deny protection to the
disliked and misunderstood, but undeniably important, object that
future generations may value highly. Failing to safeguard this art is
contrary to the preservation purposes of the Act.3
The Carter two-pronged test leads to the evidentiary problem
revealed by Martin.' Martin proved recognized stature with
documentary evidence and no in-court expert testimony.2s
Theoretically, at least, Judge Manion was surely right that if the Carter
test were to be adopted by the court, separate proof of stature was
required by expert testimony to avoid the hearsay problem. On
equitable grounds, however, the majority was no doubt right to admit
the documentary evidence proffered by Martin as to recognized
stature.2' 9 In effect, the majority in Martin rejects the Carter test,
despite paying it lip service.2g
A second practical problem in the application of the recognized
stature standard was signaled by the Committee on the Judiciary
when it rejected a per se recognized stature standard for all
modification of a work of art, namely a battle of the experts.291
Although neither case was decided on the issue of recognized stature,
the cases of Carter'92 and English293 show how crucial the relative
credibility of expert witnesses can be. The defendants in Carter found
to their detriment that impassioned opinion can degenerate into
legally discounted bias.219 The testimony of the defendants' expert
witness in English was similarly discounted by a judicial interpretation
of what may have been an offhand or creative remark.? As
collectors, critics, and curators have frequently discovered, neither
familiarity with contemporary art nor a position of authority in the
field of art is any guarantee of an ability to evaluate the current, let
alone future, importance of an individual work of art.' Furthermore,
286. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
287. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612-14 (7th Cir. 1999): supra
notes 183-203 and accompanying text.
28& See Martin, 192 F.3d at 613.
289. See id
290. The majority signaled its dislike of the two-part test by acknowledging that the
test "may be more rigorous than Congress intended." Id. at 612.
291. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6925; supra note 97-99 and accompanying text.
292. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
293. English v. BFC & R East 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446, 1997 WL 746444
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,1997).
294. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
296. The controversy surrounding the Biennial exhibitions of contemporary art at
the Whitney Museum in New York is an example of the lack of consensus among
collectors, critics, and curators on the nature and value of modern art. When the six
guest curators for the 2000 Biennial first met to submit fifty names each of artists they
considered the most important for inclusion in the show, few artists were on more
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if the Carter court was right that recognized stature may be proved
from the testimony of "society in general" or "some cross-section of
society," then is not the reliance on experts elitist and unnecessary?
The list of recommended experts in the state statutes and VARA bills
is omitted in the Act presumably to allow courts to go outside the
parameters of traditional art experts.297 In the case of public art, it is
perhaps more appropriate that recognized stature be tested against
the views of those who live and work with the art every day, those for
whom the beneficial effects of the cultural patrimony are directly felt,
rather than against the opinion of qualified but remote experts.
Finally, as is the case in most intellectual property law, the legal
elements of VARA, including the recognized stature provision, are
highly susceptible to manipulation in the face of competing policy
goals.291 Judge Baer's opinion in English is an example. 299 His finding
that the complete obstruction of murals on walls overlooking a
community garden did not amount to the murals' destruction, while
perhaps supportable by the text of VARA, defies common sense.300
His finding is understandable only when viewed in light of the public
policy concerns he then elucidates. Judge Baer finds it unthinkable,
from a policy as well as a constitutional perspective, that the
preservation of a mural on the outside wall of a building should ever
inhibit the development of an adjoining parcel of land completely
masking the mural from view." 1 Given the court's findings, no mural,
whatever its stature, is safe from urban development.
The analysis of the recognized stature provision in this part
highlights a number of problems with VARA. The recognized stature
provision fails to serve the policy goals of United States copyright law.
As a preservation measure, it protects a tiny minority of the art in the
United States that forms the artistic heritage of the nation.
Furthermore, actual and potential issues of proof threaten to
undermine the integrity of the Act. The paucity of case law in the ten
years since the enactment of VARA masks the scope of these
problems. The next part suggests one possible solution.
than one curator's list and there was "no confirmed canon." See Carol Vogel,
Choosing a Palette of Biennial Artists; Surprises in the Whitney's Selections, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 8, 1999, at El.
297. Judge Edelstein adopted this view in Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325 n.10.
298. See Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 29
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 579, 589 (1996) (citing cases in which Supreme Court opinions
on intellectual property issues have been ignored by lower courts).
299. See English v. BFC & R East 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446, 1997 WL 746444,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1997).
300. See id.
301. See id.
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IV. MORAL RIGHTS AND THE PRESERVATION OF
SIGNIFICANT WORKS OF ART: A PROPOSAL
According to one's interest in a work of art, the enactment of
VARA in 1990 was either a disastrous compromise of traditional
property rights, or a welcome acknowledgement of the principle of an
author's moral right in his creation.: The attempt to serve the dual
purpose of protecting the honor and reputation of the individual artist
while safeguarding elements of the artistic heritage of the nation
resulted in a flawed and limited act.
One solution may be to set clear goals and pursue two independent
lines of legislation.30 3 The first would be a broad recognition of an
artist's moral rights in his work. In harmony with the bulk of
copyright law, these rights would apply to all works regardless of
monetary or aesthetic stature. The aim of this legislation would be to
extend VARA to protect the honor and reputation of all living artists
through a ban on alteration, modification, mutilation, or destruction
of their original works. This may be achieved simply by the removal
of section 106A(a)(B), and the rewriting of 106A(a)(A), to include
intentional or grossly negligent distortion, mutilation, destruction, or
other modification of any work of art. No finding of recognized
stature would be required for protection against destruction of an
artwork. The amended Act would be consistent with Congress's
finding that an artist's honor and reputation is damaged by the
destruction of his work.314 Rewriting VARA in this manner would
retain the Act's secondary preservative function, but focus the Act's
intent on providing artists with a means to protect their reputation
and honor. Ideally, these moral rights would be extended to all
"authors" currently afforded protection under United States
Copyright legislation.3 5
The second line of legislation would likely be more controversial
and would have as its aim the preservation of the nation's artistic
heritage or patrimony. The national artistic heritage consists not only
of those works of art considered important for their association with
302- See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
303. The suggestion to separate and develop the preservative and moral right goals
of VARA has been made before. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Moral Right and Moral
Righteousness, 1 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 65, 82 (1997); Morton, supra note 107, at
907-16. A different proposal, but engendering similar effects, is to strengthen VARA
by permitting third-party actions by enumerated organizations, based on the model of
the California CACPA. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text; see also
Morton, supra note 107, at 903-16.
304. See supra note 256.
305. The Copyright Act of 1976 does not define "author." See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1994). Section 102(a), however, suggests a broad range of categories of -works of
authorship." This expansive definition is supported by the Supreme Court's broad
interpretations of "authors" in the Copyright Clause. See 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra
note 260, § 1.06.
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the history of the United States, but also works of art of significant
aesthetic or art historical importance, regardless of their importance
to American culture.0 6 This new legislation would draw on and
complement existing legislation on the international, federal, state,
and local levels aimed at the preservation of historical, archaeological,
and cultural artifacts.3"
The key to this proposal would be the establishment of a national
registry of highly significant art.08 Works on the registry would be
chosen for listing by a panel of experts.30 9 The panel would consider
in its selection process a work's aesthetic, art-historical, historical, and
cultural significance, regardless of current private, institutional, or
public ownership and regardless of the work's national origin or date
of creation. Proposals of individual works for the registry would be
accepted from a wide variety of sources, and an expedited registration
would be available for works threatened by imminent destruction.
Once a work is accepted for registration under this system, anyone
causing the significant modification or destruction of the work would
be liable for criminal and civil penalties. Similar registries in other
countries, Italy or France for example, have been only marginally
successful because sale of registered works is monitored, export
306. Protecting art executed outside the United States is consistent with
Merryman's concept of the public interest in cultural property as an international
obligation to protect art of all cultures and periods. See Merryman, supra note 15, at
341. The concept should be distinguished from cultural nationalism, the philosophy
that "objects forming part of the [nation's own] cultural heritage should remain in or
be returned to the national territory." Id. at 361. For recent developments on this
debate in international law, especially in Europe, see Lawrence M. Kaye, Art Wars:
The Repatriation Battle, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 79 passim (1998); John Henry
Merryman, The Free International Movement of Cultural Property, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int'l.
L. & Pol. 1, 3-9 (1998).
307. For an overview of the protections given historical and archaeological
property in the United States, see Julia H. Miller, Historic and Cultural Resources
Protection Under Historic Preservation Laws, in Heritage Resources Law: Protecting
the Archaeological and Cultural Environment 17 (Sherry Hutt et al. eds., 1999). For
the protection of the cultural heritage outside the United States, see Kifle Jote,
International Legal Protection of Cultural Heritage 125-257 (1994).
308. A similar proposal for the protection of architecturally significant modern
buildings was suggested by Gregory A. Ashe, Reflecting the Best of Our Aspirations:
Protecting Modem and Post-modem Architecture, 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 69, 90-
100 (1997). Identifying a gap in the preservation law, Ashe proposes an Architectural
Landmark Designation ("ALD"), in which architecturally significant modern
buildings would be selected by an Architectural Landmark Review Commission
("ALRC") for inclusion in a national register. See id. at 90-92. An extension of the
current regime of local, state, and national Landmark law to art in public places was
proposed by Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists' Rights and Historic
Preservation, 12 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 431, 461-65 (1994).
309. While no group of experts can be expected to agree on the significance of all
works of art put before it, the current alternative of a judge or jury is hardly a more
reliable solution. Furthermore, the panel would have the advantage in most cases of
historical and critical hindsight in its evaluation, because it will generally be
evaluating works of some age.
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permits forbidden, and the registers are used by governments in their
efforts to enforce tax compliance.310 The result is a thriving black
market in art and antiquities, unchecked illegal export, and
vulnerability to theft.3" To encourage registration in the proposed
registry, therefore, and to prevent any economic disincentive to the
owner, registration would simply trigger a complete ban on any
intentional or grossly negligent mutilation or destruction of the work.
The owner would be free to sell, donate, or export the work as he
wished. As an additional incentive and to further the preservation
purposes of the legislation, necessary expenses for the physical
preservation of the work of art-such as additional security or
restoration and maintenance of the work of art-may be tax
deductible.
Two existing national registers provide a precedent for this
proposal. The first is the National Register of Historic Places,12
established under the National Historic Preservation Act
("NHPA").3 13 The register is administered by the Secretary of the
Interior, who reviews districts, sites, and buildings significant in
American history, architecture, and culture for inclusion on the
register.314 Registration, however, does not guarantee an historic
place's physical integrity. The NHPA does not have the power to
prevent the alteration or destruction of sites. 31- Registration simply
requires a federal agency involved in a federal or federally assisted
undertaking to take into account the effect of the undertaking on the
site, and to report its findings to an Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, also established by the Act, for comment.1 6 State, local,
or private projects require no review of listed buildings.1 7
A second precedent for the proposal is the national register of
significant films authorized by the National Film Preservation Act of
1988 ("NFPA 1988").318 NFPA 1988 arose from concerns primarily in
the movie industry about the perceived damage to the director's
310. See Jote, supra note 307, at 140-44 (discussing the measures adopted by Italy
and France to protect cultural property in state and private hands); Guy Stair Sainty,
What Makes Italy a Major Black Market in Art, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1990, at 34;
Alexander Stille, Art Thieves Bleed Italy's Heritage, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1992, at 27
(citing, among other problems, chronic underfunding of the national register of Italy's
artistic patrimony under the leadership of the National Institute of the Catalogue in
Rome).
311. See Sainty, supra note 310.
312 See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(1)(A) (1985 & Supp. 1999).
313. See id. 88 470-470mm, amended by Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XL, 106 Stat. 4753
(1992).
314. See Ashe, supra note 308, at 79.
315. See id at 81.
316. See id at 79-80.
317. See id. at 81.
318. See Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1994 (1988) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 178-
1781 (1988) (repealed 1992)). On the subsequent legislative history of the Act, see
H.R. Rep. 104-558, at 8-14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3818,3818-30.
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artistic vision by the colorization of film shot originally in black-and-
white.31 9 The right infringed was characterized as the director's moral
right, and early versions of VARA contained protection for movies as
well as works of fine art.320  NFPA 1988 is not a copyright act,
however. It established a National Film Preservation Board charged
with the establishment of a National Film Registry.3 2' The Act called
for the addition to the Registry of twenty-five films per year for three
years that were deemed by the Board "culturally, historically, or
aesthetically significant. ' '32 Chosen films received a seal indicating
that they were "an enduring part of our nation's historical and cultural
heritage" and that they were in their original state.3 3 The Librarian of
Congress oversaw the choice of films.324
Under the NFPA 1988, registered films that were shown in an
altered state, for example colored or cut, had to be preceded by a
disclaimer that the original creators of the film had not participated in
the alteration.31 When the NFPA 1988 was repealed after its three-
year sunset provision was triggered, the replacement National Film
Preservation Act ("NFPA 1992")326 omitted the disclaimer provision,
thereby removing the primary incentive to respect the artistic integrity
of the original.32 7
Despite their severe limitations, the NHPA and the NFPA provide
some precedent to a national registry of significant works of art.328
Both registers are federally funded, and the NFPA has enforcement
319. See David A. Honicky, Film Labelling as a Cure for Colorization [and Other
Alterations]: A Band-Aid for a Hatchet Job, 12 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 409, 414-15
(1994); McNally, supra note 73, at 130-32; Dan Renberg, The Money of Color: Film
Colorization and the 100th Congress, 11 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 391, 404-06
(1989).
320. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 8-9 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6918-19.
321. See Honicky, supra note 319, at 420.
322. Id. at 421.
323. Id.
324. See id. at 421 n.89.
325. See id. at 421.
326. See Pub. L. No. 102-307, tit. II, 106 Stat. 267 (1992) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§
178-79).
327. See Honicky, supra note 319, at 422-23. On expiration of NFPA 1992,
Congress enacted NFPA 1996, reauthorizing the National Film Preservation Board
for another seven years. Pub. L. No. 104-285, tit. I, 110 Stat. 3377 (1996). The 1996
Act also created the National Film Preservation Foundation. The Foundation,
charged with seeking private funds to match the mere $250,000 annual federal
funding, concentrates on preserving non-commercial films that are considered most at
risk of destruction.
328. Other registries exist on an international level. For example the World
Heritage Committee, under the mandate of UNESCO's World Heritage Convention,
maintains a list of sites throughout the member states of outstanding cultural or
natural value and provides financial and technical assistance for the sites'
preservation. See Jote, supra note 307, at 250-56. United States participation is
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a-1 (1985 & Supp. 1999).
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provisions.3 29 Both registers employ the advice of experts in their
fields who make decisions in part based on aesthetic merit and
historical significance.330 The registry proposed here would gradually
provide a safety net for works of art currently unprotected by VARA,
would remove from judges and juries hard decisions on the
preservation of aesthetically challenging works of art, and establish a
national criteria for preservation. Operating in conjunction with
VARA, the two lines of legislation would together allow the artist to
protect the integrity of his own work, while the nation protects the
integrity of its artistic heritage.
Important questions remain, however. Given the great effort
expended before VARA could be enacted, it is hard to see where the
political will would be found to establish and fund the register
proposed here. The act would have to be crafted skillfully to avoid
constitutional challenge. 331 Selection of the registry panel, criteria of
selection of the art, enforcement, and the sheer numbers of works of
art to be sifted are significant hurdles. Nonetheless, the combination
of a strengthened moral rights legislation enforceable by the artist,
and a minimal preservation measure for art of all periods enforceable
by the state, would be a potent combination.
CONCLUSION
The art of painting cannot be truly judged save by such as are
themselves good painters; from others verily it is hidden even as a
strange tongue.
Albrecht Durer (1471-1528)" z
VARA is a short, but remarkable, piece of legislation.
Representative George Smith was correct when he characterized
VARA as "one of the most extraordinary realignments of private
property rights ever adopted by Congress. "' 311 By opening the door to
a federally protected moral right, Congress acknowledged, if only in a
very limited application, the principle that an artist retains a
329. See McNally, supra note 73, at 148 (discussing the enforcement by the
Attorney General of violations of NFPA).
330. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b) (authorizing Secretary of the Interior to accept
nominations for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places from State
Historic Preservation Officers and State Historic Preservation Review Boards);
Honicky, supra note 319, at 420 n.83 (listing examples of organizations from whom
the members of the National Film Preservation Board may be chosen).
331. The primary concern would be that listing on the registry might constitute a
"taking." On the constitutionality of historical preservation statutes and landmarking
ordinances, as well as of a proposed Architectural Landmark Designation, see Ashe,
supra note 308, at 74-78, 100-01; Gerstenblith, supra note 308, at 457-61.
332. The Writings of Albrecht Durer 177 (William Martin Conway ed. & trans.,
1958).
333. See supra note 6.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
personality interest, independent of his economic interests, in the
physical object of his creation, even if he no longer owns the object.
Less dramatic has been the practical result of the enactment of
VARA and state moral rights statutes. Cases invoking moral rights
are few. The existence of moral rights remains little known, even
among artists who are the rights' beneficiaries. For example, a search
of Artforum, one of the foremost magazines for critics, curators, and
practitioners of contemporary art, reveals only one short piece on
VARA in the decade since its enactment.
Nonetheless, as art becomes increasingly visible and artists take on
celebrity status, VARA will be invoked more frequently and its
problematic clauses, such as the recognized stature provision, will
stand at the forefront of the ensuing litigation. Judges and juries will
have to tackle the issues raised by recognized stature, issues that are
today largely theoretical or dodged by the courts. Meanwhile,
important works of art will remain unprotected because the artist is
unknown, deceased, or otherwise unwilling or unable to protect the
art through his moral rights.
Courts are suited to the role of protecting the personal interests of
artists through the protection of their moral rights. On the other
hand, the protection of art of established significance, art that is truly
of recognized stature, should not depend on the judgment of an
individual judge or jury. When Durer wrote of the "art of painting,"
he meant his craft, the process of artistic production. But his remark
is often true for the meaning and wider significance of a work of art.
The preservative purpose of VARA should be distinguished from the
establishment of moral rights. The dual line of legislation proposed in
this Note offers an imperfect, but effective, protection for a wide
range of art, while respecting the interests of artists, property owners,
the public, and later generations for whom we hold the art in trust.
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